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Contested Water Governance
in Myanmar/Burma: Politics, the Peace
Negotiations and the Production of Scale
Johanna M. Götz
6.1 Introduction
It’s a clear morning in early 2017. The sun has only come up a few hours ago,
however, the heat of the day is already tangible. Villagers and activists from all over
Myanmar/Burma,1 media representatives, Karen National Union (KNU) members
and non-state armed forces peacefully gather on an island in the Salween/Thanlwin
river in Karen State. They talk about the river’s importance to the livelihood of
communities and about its beauty. They express their rejection of the construction
of mega-dams across it and discuss these dams’ influences on conflict and peace
building. Prayers and poems, discussions and talks, pictures and music try to
capture the river in all its dimensions. A couple of days after the event, a letter
arrives from the Karen State Government addressed to the KNU condemning this
‘unauthorized’ gathering. It criticizes the KNU, stating inter alia that they had
infringed the agreements of the National Ceaseﬁre Agreement (NCA), including
Article 25(c) that states:
[…] government and the individual […] Ethnic Armed Organizations shall coordinate the
implementation of tasks that are speciﬁc to the areas of the respective Ethnic Armed
Organization. (NCA 2015)
These criticisms are connected with the request towards the KNU to follow the
NCA by controlling their armed members. What can this short insight tell about
Johanna M. Götz, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Bonn &
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1I use the terms Burma/Myanmar, and further names changed under the 2008 constitution,
interchangeably. This is far from implying that naming is irrelevant. However, throughout a
myriad of conversations, I realized that either term has its own limits. For now, I therefore choose
to follow the advice of a colleague stating: “I think we have to move beyond that debate – there are
more important issues at the moment.”
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water governance in Myanmar? Throughout this chapter, I demonstrate how the
Salween River (cf. Fig. 6.1a: Myanmar’s nation-state borders and the Salween
River Basin) represents much more than just material water flowing downhill, and
how the river is deeply embedded into a complex history and current socio-political
struggles. Simultaneously, I show how highly contested power-relations play out in
claims for decision-making around various scales, and its signiﬁcance to the
reshaping of water governance. To approach this, two substantial foci arise as
fundamental conceptual frames for this chapter: (1) an understanding of water as
hydrosocial (Linton/Budds 2014); and (2) how within that understanding the pro-
duction of scale is historically embedded, highly political and socially contested.
Overall, I show how the scales of water governance in Myanmar are currently being
contested and argue that this constitutes a key battleground for future
decision-making not only in terms of water governance, but also with implications
for the peace negotiations and the federal structure of government that it is working
towards.
Burma is at a unique historic moment as a key struggle over the future rules of
water governance, and the role and relative influence of actors involved, is unfolding.
With clear rules and laws around water yet to be established, different narratives,
imaginaries, material practices on the ground and institutional arrangements around
water governance become apparent. This becomes evident looking at two groups of
actors with rather different visions: The National Water Resources Committee
(NWRC) and its Advisory Group (AG) acting under the Union government, and a
group of non-state actors connected to the Salween Peace Park (SPP) within the
KNU-controlled, ethnic-minority dominated Mutraw District in Karen State. While
at the Union level a rather centralized, expert-led water policy-making process is
seeking to generate a uniﬁed Myanmar narrative, actors around the SPP propose a
contrasting arena of community-led, bottom-up federalism.
This chapter builds on an explorative approach with qualitative interviews and
informal conversations conducted in 2017 (Götz 2017). Actors consisted of infor-
mants connected to the NWRC (including: NWRC members, AG individuals) and
the SPP (including: informants from local CSOs and the KNU; international sup-
porters).2 The research is further supported through media and document analysis.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, I outline the conceptual frame of the
chapter before providing some relevant background on Burma’s socio-political
history as it relates to current claims around the scales of water governance. Recent
developments regarding the peace negotiations and the struggle over the degree of
decentralization are also highlighted. Subsequently, the two groups of actors with
their speciﬁc claims around future rules of water governance and its implications for
the production of scale are introduced. Finally, I draw those claims together to
explore the arenas and processes through which scale is being contested, before
concluding on the implications for the future rules of water governance in Myanmar.
2To protect the informant’s anonymity all informants quoted in this chapter are coded in accor-
dance with one of the two key groups they are related to (i.e. NWRC or SPP).
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Fig. 6.1 Articulated scalar manifestations/ claims around water governance in Burma/ Myanmar.
aMyanmar’s nation-state borders and the Salween River Basin. b The Salween Peace Park within
Karen State’s/ Kawthoolei’s Hpapun/ Mutraw District. Source Cartography by Chandra
Jayasuriya, University of Melbourne, with permission
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6.2 Water Through a Hydrosocial Lens
and the Production of Scale
Considering water from a hydrosocial perspective holds major implications for
understanding water and water governance (e.g. Boelens et al. 2016; Linton/Budds
2014). Through a hydrosocial lens, water is seen not as a mere material “natural
resource”, but rather as a “historical and relational-dialectic process” (Linton/Budds
2013: 10) wherein water and society constantly constitute themselves as “so-
cionatural hybrids (cf. ibid.; Linton 2010). Viewing water and society not as two
dualistic entities but as “hybrid nature” (Budds/Hinojosa 2012) reveals how water
and society evolve through one another and consequently, water governance is
understood as more than institutions and policies, but reflects the wider array of
co-constituting human and more-than-human relationships. This leads to the insight
that “water is not politically neutral, but instead both reflects and reproduces
relations of social power” (Perreault 2015: 118).
Scale as a concept has been subject of heated debates (e.g. Brenner 2001; Herod
2011; Neumann 2015). While some call for eliminating ‘scale’ as a concept
(Marston et al. 2005), others show the relevance of it when applied critically (e.g.
Leitner/Miller 2007). Critical research has sought to redeﬁne scale away from
understanding it as hierarchical, ﬁxed and apolitical towards an understanding of
scale as:
[…] something that is produced; a process that is always deeply heterogeneous, conflictual,
and contested. Scale becomes the arena and moment, both discursively and materially,
where sociospatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and
regulated. Scale, therefore, is both the result and the outcome of social struggle for power
and control. (Swyngedouw 1997: 140)
Within this understanding, debates around water governance and the politics and
production of scale have gained momentum (e.g. Dore/Lebel 2010; Norman
et al. 2015). Within a hydrosocial understanding, scalar relations have been
addressed through concepts like ‘waterscapes’ (Budds/Hinojosa 2012) or “hy-
drosocial territories” (Boelens et al. 2016). Drawing from these debates, I focus on the
processes that influence the (re)construction of scalar notions (i.e. their continuous
(re)production, contestation and reconﬁguration) and (temporal) manifestations
related to water in its socio-material dimensions rather than looking at scale per se.
Considering the widespread understanding of socially-constructed scales, within
water policy-making it can be observed that certain scales are given priority, while
downplaying or marginalizing less obvious scalar networks that influence water.
Budds/Hinojosa (2012: 119) emphasize the importance of overcoming the still
prevalent practice to “take the hierarchical physical boundaries and administrative
structures that characterize most instances of water governance as given” and instead
focus on the politics and production of scale. This becomes evident when looking at
the widespread use of the watershed or river basin as the seemingly pre-given, most
suitable scale for water policy-making. Since the 1990s, the old concept of river
basin management gained new relevance and became the scale for water governance
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in “the West” (and subsequently far beyond) (Molle 2015; Warner et al. 2008). This
is embedded in a notion of hydrological boundaries of the watershed, which is
assumed to be a ‘natural’ scale for governing. However, in fact this assumption
renders both scale and water as ﬁxed, and thus stands in stark contrast with a
hydrosocial understanding. While it is clear that hydrological flows – as water’s
materiality – exist and are indeed relevant, taking the scale of the river basin for
granted does leave out important social, cultural and political dimensions. As
Blomquist/Schlager (2005: 103–5) argue, choosing the watershed as the appropriate
scale for water governance is always a conscious choice – rather than a ‘natural’
given necessity – that brings political momentum with it. Ultimately, deﬁning a scale
for water governance (be it the watershed, administrative boundaries or other
envisioned or drawn spaces) brings with it questions about which actors are involved
in decision-making, affected by it and how power is distributed. As such, it is not
about neglecting material flows within hydrologically deﬁned watersheds, but to
avoid considering these flows as independent from other hydrosocial arrangements.
6.3 Transforming Water Governance in Myanmar
The production of scale around water governance and associated claims for power
are, as I will argue, deeply embedded within a wider historical context. Under
British colonialism, the borders of what is known as Myanmar today were deﬁned
for the ﬁrst time. Included in it were the areas of Bamar-dominated “Burma Proper”
under the centralized authority of the British, which covered the central low-lying
areas. The more remote “Frontier Areas” in the hilly border regions, meanwhile,
were inhabited by different non-Bamar ethnic minority groups and were under less
rigorous authority by the British, thus “allowing traditional local leaders to run the
day-to-day affairs” (Callahan 2007: 12). After independence, a short attempt to ﬁnd
a peaceful federal solution as written in the 1947 Constitution ended abruptly
through Ne Win’s coup in 1962. The decades to follow were characterized by
centralized authoritarian regimes (Ninh/Arnold 2016). However, as Callahan (2007:
12–13) states, there have been areas that:
[t]hroughout the postcolonial era, […] have never come under anything approaching central
control. Large stretches of territory […] and large numbers of people have been governed,
administered, and exploited by armed state challengers, such as […] the Karen National
Union.
Recent economic and political reforms in Myanmar since 2010–11 have led to
an increased liberalization of economic policy, attracting growing volumes of for-
eign investment. However, Burma remains unique in the region as it is in the state
of a fragile (partial) ceaseﬁre rather than peace. Within Myanmar’s emerging
political system of National and Regional/State governance, not formally repre-
sented non-state actors remain highly influential and are seeking strong localized
federalism. The question remains open as to what a future federal system will look
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like (e.g. Ninh/Arnold 2016). Given that water is highly political, especially if
understood from a hydrosocial perspective, then water governance in Burma must
be positioned in this wider historical and political context. With the recent change
from military dictatorship to a quasi-civilian government, clear rules and laws
around water, or the scales of water governance, are yet to be established, which
will, amongst other things, depend on the degree of decentralization under a future
federal agreement.
After decades of military dictatorship and with it the oppression of most critical
thinking, the nascent state of literature on water governance in Myanmar is
unsurprising.3 However, there are a growing number of articles, reports and
scholarly literature on water-related issues. This includes reports looking at the
current water-related Union government institutions and respective legal frame-
works (e.g. Kattelus et al. 2014; van Meel et al. 2014). While providing some key
issues (lack of transparency; public participations), solutions are mainly proposed
along the line of a globally hegemonic water management approach, namely
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). Thereby, most research taking a
localized perspective raises a management approach rather than a hydrosocial
perspective (ibid.). Alternative paradigms and framings of water are much less
discussed in academic literature on water governance in Burma, with some notable
exceptions (e.g. Middleton et al. 2017; Suhardiman et al. 2017).
Within the two subsequent sections, I aim to exemplify the importance of
moving beyond a simpliﬁed understanding of water governance and emphasize the
wider hydrosocial relations and their scalar politics. Figure 6.1: Articulated scalar
manifestations/claims around water governance in Burma/Myanmar illustrates the
examined articulated scalar manifestations and claims around water governance,
including Fig. 6.1a: Myanmar’s nation-state borders and the Salween River Basin,
and Fig. 6.1b: The Salween Peace Park within Karen State’s/Kawthoolei’s Hpapun/
Mutraw District. While the visualization of this may carry political clout with it, the
mappings illustrate the intertwined and overlapping scalar articulations, unveiling
the complexity of the future rules of water governance in Burma.
6.4 National Water Policy Regime
With the transition towards a quasi-democratic government system, a major
restructuring of state-based institutions has unfolded in Myanmar. This has been
accompanied by new discourses and visions around the future-rules of water
governance, which will influence how hydrosocial relations unfold. Under the
presidential degree of U Thein Sein, a working group called the National Water
Resources Committee (NWRC) was established in 2013 with the goal to “take
responsibility for the overall management of national water resources and to
3This may not include sources in Burmese/other, ethnic-minority languages and unpublished work.
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facilitate for a more coordinated approach” (Nesheim et al. 2016: 21). After the
dissolution of the committee at the end of U Thein Sein’s presidential period in
March 2016, the NWRC was reestablished by the new NLD-led government in
June 2016 (personal communication, NWRC2).
The current NWRC and its Advisory Group (AG) includes a network of actors
from water-related Union ministries, departments, representatives from the State
and Regional level, the mayors of Yangon, Naypyidaw and Mandalay, and ‘water
experts’ under the Chair of Vice President U Henry Van Thio. The NWRC
Secretary is the Directorate of Water Resources and Improvement of River Systems
(DWRI) of the Union Ministry of Transport and Communication (NWRC 2015,
2017). The makeup of the NWRC, with involved ministries amongst others
including the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Electric Power and Energy, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation, and the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environmental Conservation, already hints towards the heteroge-
nous interests existent within water-related decision-making. Reflecting the frag-
mented responsibilities across sectors and ministries, one objective of the NWRC is
the “strengthening of inter-ministerial cooperation, communication and information
sharing” (NWRC 2015, Art. 2.4(ii)).
A key mandate of the NWRC is to draft water-related rules and regulations. With
the National Water Policy (NWP) ﬁrst published in February 2014 (NWRC 2015)
and approved by the cabinet in June 2015 (personal communications, NWRC1 and
NWRC6) together with the National Water Framework Directive (NWFD), two
documents have already been published while a National Water Law is currently
being drafted but not publicly available at the time of writing (January 2019; See
also, Bright, Chap. 5, this volume). This is meant to be an umbrella law for any
water-related laws.
Key paradigms and concepts visible in the NWRC’s work indicate a rather cen-
tralized, expert-led water-policy making that is shaping speciﬁc narratives around
water in Burma. Rereading the analysis of Nesheim et al. (2016) on current institu-
tional settings suggests that hegemonic global influences can be found in Myanmar’s
emerging policies. For instance, the NWFD does not only carry the name of but
[…] is inspired by the EU WFD [European Union Water Framework Directive] in that it
parallels several of the same principles as those in the European directive, including among
others River Basin Management. (ibid: 22)
However, in contrast to the EU WFD, it is not set to be a binding law, but is
instead “an umbrella statement of general principles governing the exercise of
legislative and/or executive (or devolved) powers by the Union, the States and
Regions, and the local governing bodies” (van Meel et al. 2014: 12). IWRM is
communicated as the central paradigm. The NWP clearly states this in various
places, for example:
[T]here are inequities in distribution and lack of a uniﬁed perspective in planning, man-
agement and use of water resources, i.e. little or no knowledge about [IWRM] except in the
domain of water professionals. The whole country needs to be aware of IWRM principles
and participatory approach. (NWRC 2015: 2, emphasis added)
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With IWRM as a central paradigm, various water-related sectors are to be ‘in-
tegrated’ under the auspices of the NWRC as a powerful apex body. In so-called
‘international best practice’, IWRM has tended to go together with a call for the
river basin as the appropriate level of governance (cf. Molle 2015). In Burma, a call
for river basin management can be observed in the narrative of several government
documents and actors, even though it is not formulated as the only level of
governance:
All the elements of the water cycle […] are interdependent and the basic hydrological unit
is the river basin, which should be considered as the basic hydrological unit for planning.
(NWRC 2015: 15)
Ongoing projects further accelerate the focus on a combined IWRM approach at
the river basin scale, such as the Ayeyarwady Integrated River Basin Management
(AIRBM) project ﬁnanced by the World Bank with the objective “to help Myanmar
develop the institutions and tools needed to enable informed decision making in the
management of Myanmar’s water resources and to implement integrated river basin
management of the Ayeyarwady Basin” (MoT 2017). It should, however, be
emphasized that to date no transboundary river basin organizations or similar
agreements exist for the country’s rivers, even though some informants are
proposing such institutionalizations (personal communication NWRC3, 2017).
Rather, the ‘natural’ river basins seem to be bounded by the borders of the
nation-state.
With this Union government-led decision of IWRM implementation at a river
basin level for the whole country, as afﬁrmed in the NWP and materialized in
projects such as the AIRBM, the river basin as a speciﬁc scale for water governance
is (consciously or not) being produced as an appropriate level for decision-making
over water. Furthermore, by prescribing a hegemonic global concept at the level of
seemingly ‘natural’ boundaries, IWRM is being raised as the appropriate basis for
decision-making. This brings with it a centralizing tendency: this occurs strategi-
cally, by prescribing IWRM as an overall paradigm for the country from a Union
level perspective. Thereby, other established water governance practices (e.g.
customary rights) might be overwritten. It also occurs institutionally, by ‘inte-
grating’ various institutions – with their distinct power relations – under the
umbrella of water management whereby a (re)centralization of power through
IWRM implementation has been predicted and observed in other contexts (e.g.
Mehta et al. 2014). On paper, IWRM is supportive of decentralization thus
intending to redistribute decision-making to ‘lower’ levels. For Burma, this would
mean decentralization towards the Region or State governments. However, what
sounds locally empowering in theory might prove to be centralizing in practice, as a
lack of capacity and internal conflict at the Region/State level might redirect power
back to the National level or to certain powerful factions (cf. Mehta et al. 2014 for a
South African exploration). Moreover, current customary rights and established
practices around water governance, as prevalent in some areas, would be over-
written by Union state-controlled IWRM practices.
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The above-mentioned centralizing tendency becomes further consolidated when
examining national-level water policy actors who, besides the river basin, place a
strong emphasis on the Union government and, with this, a centralized level of
water governance.
The objective of the National Water Policy is to take cognizance of the existing situation, to
propose a framework for creation of a system of laws and institutions and for a plan of
action with a uniﬁed national perspective. (NWRC 2015, emphasis added)
[I]f the country is going to federalization and […] if there is a region and region conflict of
interest, there will be the national level coming in and decide. And also, if it is a
national-level concern, like the national/international, transboundary river, then the national
government is concerned […]. So [the National Water Law] will be the master of all the
laws related to water […] and everything is to be integrated […]. According to our
Constitution, the right is under the [Union] state of handling water. (personal communi-
cation NWRC3, 2017, emphasis added)
While universal rights are underlined, the power of decision-making is clearly
given to the central government (at least in the second instance). The NWRC has
repeatedly been referred to as an important apex body for the water governance of
Myanmar inter alia by its members (personal communications, 2017) and envisions
a future influential role. The NWP further underpins this intended central position
of the committee by stating:
[The] NWRC should be a legislative body in national water sector and should have
authorization of the government to play a signiﬁcant role in any national/state level water
use […] of consumptive or non-consumptive nature. (NWRC 2015: 46)
The centralization of power is also influenced by the relatively small number of
individuals – namely a limited number of “water professionals” (personal com-
munication NWRC1, 2017) – active within the central institutions.
The NWRC and its AG are a signiﬁcant part of current efforts to pave the way
for future water governance at a Union level by drafting policies and laws.
However, in practice they still do not have the ﬁnal say in whether those are
adopted within the rather fragmented government arrangements of the country. At
the same time, they further their claim to legitimacy through collaborating with
actors like the World Bank in the AIRBM project and other International Financial
Institutions (IFIs), NGOs and national governments (i.e. the Netherlands or
Norway). Thus, relying on concepts with a hegemonic status can be seen as
important legitimization of authority by the Union within a ‘transnational network’
(cf. Hensengerth 2015). Additionally, the NWRC has been rather successful in
being visible thorough, for example, joint reports with partners which represent
some of the little information that is available on water governance in Burma (e.g.
van Meel et al. 2014 on IWRM). Yet, some civil society actors repeatedly chal-
lenge the Union government’s cooperation with actors like the World Bank and
question the degree of participation in associated projects.
Historically-grown power relations in the central Bamar-majority area are
reflected in today’s centralizing tendencies both institutionally and materially (e.g.
within the AIRBM project). Under colonial rule, this centralized control proved true
96 J. M. Götz
for “Burma Proper” while the “Frontier Areas” were administered indirectly. After
independence, little changed in those highly centralized power relations (Ninh/
Arnold 2016: 225–6). Simultaneously, however, as Callahan (2007: 12–13) notes,
the following authoritarian regimes were at no time able to bring the whole country
under central control. Rather, different Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) set up
their own ‘state-like structures’ and governance. Questions around decentralization
and federalism date back to the post-colonial era and remain unresolved. While
decentralization seems to be a rather universal goal, the degree of power redistri-
bution remains one of the most crucial questions towards federalism in the current
peace negotiation process (Ninh/Arnold 2016: 226). Decentralization – currently
bound to the 2008 constitution – will create new scales of governance and redeﬁne
power relations, which also holds implications for water governance. While the
NWRC seems to support decentralization of water governance, for now it claims
and afﬁrms its leadership role as an apex body:
Federal States should take charges for water governance and decision making around water
in their state. But, for the early years they should [be] under the umbrella of Control
Government body like NWRC. (personal communication NWRC5, 2017)
Concluding, it can be claimed that through rather centralized, expert-led water
policy-making a national-state-scaled water policy narrative framed in a river
basin-scaled unit of governance is currently emerging. These spatiotemporal
notions – built around a hegemonic, uniﬁed Myanmar narrative on water gover-
nance – reflect historically-grown power relations and highlight the hydrosocial
relations within which water and society constantly (re)produce themselves (cf.
Linton/Budds 2014).
6.5 Salween Peace Park: A Local Initiative
The recently ofﬁcially proclaimed Salween Peace Park (SPP) (e.g. KESAN 2019),
located in Mutraw District in Northern Karen State (Fig. 6.1b: The Salween Peace
Park within Karen State’s/Kawthoolei’s Hpapun/Mutraw District), poses a quite
different arena of governing water. A group of actors including community rep-
resentatives, KNU local leadership, and members of CSOs push for their own
vision within an area of over 5,000 km2, which encloses a range of ‘community’
and reserved forests, wildlife sanctuaries and customary land (KNU and KESAN
2016; personal communications, 2017). These actors envision
[a] grassroots, people-centered alternative to the previous Myanmar government and for-
eign companies’ plans for destructive development in the Salween River basin. Instead of
massive dams on the Salween River, we see small hydropower and decentralized solar
power […]. Instead of megaprojects that threaten conflict and perhaps the resumption of
war, we seek a lasting peace and a thriving ecosystem where people live in harmony with
the nature around them. (KNU/KESAN 2016: 3)
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Based on these visions, a clear narrative becomes prevalent that calls for a
“bottom-up”, “community-based” approach with traditional systems to be pre-
served and promoted. Thereby ‘local’ people shall have “the right to
self-governance”, natural resources and wildlife shall be protected, and “Karen
indigenous people’s culture and life” are to be preserved (personal communication
SPP3, 2017). In contrast to ‘traditional’ conservation areas, which tend to relocate
people outside of the area, the SPP is claimed as integrating communities into it.
One involved individual argues that there are many connecting
…issues that need to be considered when we talk about water governance and water
management issues, because water is very political. Water is life, and everybody uses water
every day. (Personal communication SPP1, 2017)
Here, a considerably different narrative of water that is more overtly stated as
political is voiced out, which is also antagonistic vis-à-vis the rather centralized
views described above. As the recently released SPP Charter (SPP Steering
Committee/KNU 2018) demonstrates, a strong focus is placed on the ‘community’
as a central scale for decision-making. Connected to ‘natural’ ecosystems – for
instance “community forests” – this scale can be, analogous to the watershed,
understood as a naturalized social scale with the ‘community’ being handled as
seemingly given entity and scale (cf. Cohen/McCarthy 2014). Nevertheless, the
SPP Charter recognizes that “the Salween River is a precious resource that sustains
the indigenous Karen people’s way of life, and people who live beyond the
boundaries of the Salween Peace Park” (SPP Steering Committee/KNU 2018: 30),
recognizing the fluid character of water and the wider hydrosocial network beyond
the borders of the SPP.
Spatially the SPP is based on historically-rooted power relations. It is within this
historic context that the proposed borders of the SPP and therewith the envisioned
scales of water governance are actively co-produced. The British colonial rule
brought with it some major implications for power-relations within Myanmar. The
“Frontier areas” included a small area of today’s Karen State, namely the so-called
Salween District. As part of these historically more autonomous areas, today’s
Mutraw District – while far from uncontested – up to this day “[…] remains the
most autonomous KNU-controlled region and has never been brought under cen-
tralized state rule” (Jolliffe 2016: 9).
After independence, power-relations shifted several times not only between the
KNU and Union government, but also amongst different KNU districts (Brenner
2017). During the 1990s, Mutraw District under Brigade 5 gained power relative to
other districts due to declining economic trade with Thailand and strong inter-
ventions by Myanmar’s armed forces. Power struggles at this time, according to
Brenner (2017), led to today’s factions within the KNU. The proposed SPP is
located exactly in this still very much autonomous region, covering a majority of
today’s Mutraw District. Although the historic context can merely be touched upon,
it already shows that the extent of today’s SPP is anything but coincidental.
Historically grown power-relations (re)shaped speciﬁc spaces and enable
claim-making for future envisioned scales.
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In order to legitimize explicit visions of the SPP, different strategies can be
observed. These include reinforcing the visions and scalar politics of the SPP by
raising public awareness inter alia by initiating debates and campaigning through
protests and media releases (cf. Dore/Lebel 2010 for similar strategies in the
Mekong). Solidarity with other ethnic minority communities also connects the SPP
to wider networks within and beyond Myanmar. Furthermore, actors working to
further the SPP engage in protests against mega-dam development and thereby
connect to a network of a localized – but also global – anti-dam movement (e.g.
SSN et al. 2017). A range of articles, short documentaries and meetings further
campaign for the idea of the SPP contributing to the contestation and production of
scale (e.g. KESAN 2017).
Another way of consolidating claims to the right to govern are formalized in
KNU policies related to “natural resources governance” (i.e. land and forest policy).
The comprehensive KNU Land Policy was ﬁrst ratiﬁed in 1974 (KNU 2015) and
most recently revised in May 2016 (TBC 2016). While the KNU is also planning on
its own water policy (Personal communications SPP1 and SPP2, 2017), the KNU
Land Policy also already includes clear visions about water governance, stating for
instance
The ethnic nationalities are the ultimate owners of all lands, forests, water, water enterprises
and natural resources. (KNU 2015: 5)
This stands in direct contrast to the 2008 Constitution which deﬁnes the Union
as “the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the
ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union” (Union of
Myanmar 2008: 10).
The existence of autonomous laws within KNU-controlled areas represents a
clear call for self-determination and different realities of current and future power
structures:
This is KNU-controlled area, the Government is not able to come and set up their
administration. KNU has its administration, […and] operations, KNU collects taxes, KNU,
even though they are not able to provide services, but in some way, they protect the people
in their controlled territories, so the people believe and trust them […]. And we are still in
the […] stage of negotiation with the Government that ‘you have to recognize our policies
and laws (and) administrations (while) we recognize your administration’. (Personal
communication SPP1, 2017)
Hong (2017) within a legal pluralism frame looks at those “autonomous laws”
within Burma and how the creation of law – may it be drafted by the state or, as in
the case of the KNU, by an ethnic de-facto government – not only tries to con-
solidate power of the relevant actors, but through it contributes to the reshaping of
scales. Referring to the KNU Land Policy, Hong (2017: 11) shows how law may
serve “as a multi-scalar multi-temporal connecting tissue between the practice of
autonomy in the here and now, and a long-term desire for self-determination and
recognition.” Looking at the SPP shows how scalar claims are being voiced out and
how those are always closely connected to other (materialized/envisioned) scalar
articulations – as with the land of the Karen people: Kawthoolei.
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However, it is important to recognize that a uniﬁed, self-determined Kawthoolei
is not self-evident. In early 2017, elections were held to vote for the new KNU
central government. Power-relations shifted heavily towards Saw Mutu Say Po’s
faction, pushing aside the opposition under Naw Zipporah Sein. While the former is
known to be rather pro-business and open to the NCA and adjoining processes in
their current form, the latter tends to be more nationalistic and has its strongest
support within autonomous areas such as Mutraw District (Jolliffe 2017). While
striving for peace is omnipresent, the ways of achieving it vary greatly,4 and the
ideas around peace and (water) governance represented in the SPP are not feasible
for all KNU-influenced territories. This is especially true as visions range from
‘pro-development’ to “conservation of traditional ways of life” (Jolliffe 2016). How
‘appropriate’ arrangements of governance will look like, are, however, up for
debate, bringing the focus back to the heart of the scale debate and its highly
political notion. Because, as Jolliffe (2017: n.p.) states, while Mutraw District
oversees one of “the most powerful and well-supported KNU military units [, it has]
barely been engaged in negotiations in the peace process so far.” This limited
representation might further fuel the SPP’s narrative of the ‘right’ level of
decision-making with a clear stance against any centralized approach of water
governance.
The degree of power held by the central KNU administration seems to be at least
twofold. Firstly, it seems to serve as a source of legitimization to get ofﬁcial
recognition
So, to make sure this [(SPP charter)] is ofﬁcial, we need to bring that document to the KNU
decision-makers, to make sure it is a kind of ofﬁcial document, an ofﬁcial regulation,
ofﬁcial policy to rule the Peace Park. (Personal communication SPP2, 2017)
Secondly, one informant emphasized that “it’s not that the KNU central is
establishing [the SPP] at the KNU level”, rather “the local people, they’re the ones
who are working to establish the Salween Peace Park” in a process that is hap-
pening “gradually, from the bottom up”. Concluding that, as it is being established,
it is “then eventually going up […] to get recognized at the central [KNU] level”
(personal communication SPP3, 2017). As such, internal power relations and their
contestation become revealed.
Talking to one informant involved in the SPP about the national water law
currently being drafted, it becomes quite evident that a more or less centralized
national scale is not being recognized:
No, [the National Water Law would not have any influence within the SPP area] because
the Salween Peace Park, as we say, is a demonstration to self-determination. It is not about
the Union Government saying, ‘you have to do this and that’ – it’s independent. As this is
exactly what we are calling for: the right to self-determination. (Personal communication
SPP2, 2017)
4This has become evidence once again in the recent (temporary) suspension of the KNU from the
peace negotiations, demonstrating discrepancies both within the KNU and in relation to the central
government.
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With this call for self-determination, the scalar visions around the SPP empha-
size local values of water and the right of local uses to beneﬁt. To sum up, it can be
argued that a narrative of a more localized arena of community-led, bottom-up
decision-making within a federalism of self-determination can be observed.
6.6 Contesting Scale: A Battleground of Water
Governance in Burma
As laid out in the previous sections, water governance in Myanmar is far from being
undisputed or apolitical, but rather reveals a battleground around different scales at
which water is to be decided upon in the future. This chapter represents only a small
fraction of claims available. Nevertheless, it shows the signiﬁcance of looking
beyond both a naturalized understanding of water as well as an oversimpliﬁcation
of ‘appropriate’ scales of water policy-making. Following an understanding of scale
as being hydrosocially produced inevitably opens up questions around actors
involved in (re)producing scales of water governance.
The sections above took a closer look at two sets of key actors, namely the
NWRC and its AG, which can be seen to represent a centralized, national scale
under the Union government, and KNU members, CSOs, and activists closely
related to the SPP in Mutraw District, Karen State as one example of a more
localized approach to water governance. Interestingly, both set of actors legitimized
their respective claims by “rescaling to ecosystem spaces” (e.g. watershed or
community forest) and “rescaling to jurisdictional scales” (e.g. States/Regions
under the Union or Kawthoolei under a strong KNU and SPP) (Cohen/McCarthy
2014: 19). Figure 6.1: Articulated scalar manifestations/claims around water gov-
ernance in Burma/Myanmar exempliﬁes these intertwined and overlapping scalar
projects. Those groups of actors are only two among many intersecting networks
contesting scales of water governance and the observed scalar claims are just an
extract of many interconnected and overlaying visions out there. However, it
becomes evident by introducing those two different networks of actors that diverse
visions and paradigms around water governance exist, which aim at different scalar
articulations at which decisions are to be made at.
Regarding how scales are being produced, different strategies are evident.
Amongst them are legal strategies of actors drafting their own respective policies
under differently recognized institutional arrangements and power-relations (i.e.
NWRC vs. KNU/SPP) that are to regulate speciﬁc arenas (nation-state vs.
Kawthoolei). While the NWRC aims at integrating the various claims and actors
related to water governance on a uniﬁed Myanmar scale, the actors around the SPP
are instead focusing on their own regulations at more localized scales. Thereby, the
seemingly ‘ﬁxed’ national scale is being contested.
To support their claims, both groups draw on different concepts that connect
them to different local, national and transnational networks (cf. Boelens et al. 2016;
6 Contested Water Governance in Myanmar/Burma … 101
Hensengerth 2015). With its claim for IWRM and its implication for water gov-
ernance at the river basin, the NWRC and its AG focus on a dominant concept
recognized by other governments, IFIs and INGOs. In contrast, while Peace Parks
are also an internationally recognized concept, the actors around the SPP distance
themselves from a pure conservationist approach and instead focus on community-
based decision-making with rather strong ‘indigenous’ notions (e.g. “Karen tradi-
tional lifestyle”) thus relating themselves to a network of national and international
non-state actors as grassroots activist and CSOs. They also engage in wider protests
against mega-dam development and, with it, against centralized infrastructure
construction conducted by state-related actors (IFIs, global investors, etc.).
Discursively, actors draw their own speciﬁc visions and “scalar narratives”
(Swyngedouw 1997: 140), legitimizing respective ideas about the ‘right’ scales of
decision-making around water. Intending to communicate (largely) within their
respective networks both sets of actors increase their visibility by releasing docu-
mentation on their envisioned scales (i.e. rather techno-scientiﬁc reports vs.
politicizing press releases), both at times supported by maps of the contested scales
(e.g. van Meel et al. 2014 or KNU/KESAN 2016). Looking at the proposed scales
for future rules of water governance within a hydrosocial framing – while con-
sidering the highly political dimension water carries – puts the current peace
negotiation process at the very heart of the debate. Claims around the appropriate
scale for water governance closely connect to wider claims around decentralization
and federalism, which will inevitably produce new scales at which decisions will be
made at, and with it the forms of power (re)distribution. This contestation
emphasizes current politics of scale
We are considering for governance and management of water resources in [a] federal
system, but to form this system […] depend[s mainly] on the political change and the
changes of the governance system. Without having federal states and regions, it is
impossible to have federal system for Myanmar’s water [governance]. (Personal commu-
nication NWRC6, 2017)
The new Myanmar government has promised to lead the country toward a devolved, federal
democracy. The Karen are not waiting idly for this: the Salween Peace Park is federal
democracy in action. (KNU/KESAN 2016: 3)
The purpose of claiming certain scales for water governance for all informants
seems to be a genuine will to reach some sort of “change for the better.” How that
change is to look like, however, differs tremendously. Different framings –
depending on varying priorities and goals – then have an influence on how scale is
understood, constituted and (re)produced (cf. Sneddon/Fox 2012). Underlying
power-relations will contribute signiﬁcantly in deﬁning which visions will prevail.
Although the enormous power of the Union government as an actor should not
be neglected, the complexity of power relations in Burma should not be disregarded
either. The NWRC consists of members from the Union government and is backed
by it and a range of international players, but does not have unlimited authority.
The SPP arena is located in an autonomous region where, up to this day, the Union
government has limited influence. This autonomy tries to be maintained in a time of
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radical political change through repeated calls for self-determination. In turn, the
SPP is also connected to a wider network of actors supporting their claims and
thereby strengthens their proposed scales for future decision-making around water.
6.7 Towards Future Rules of Water Governance
Let us move back to the introductory incident around the Salween River. I will
highlight how, by moving beyond a simpliﬁed understanding of water as an apo-
litical resource to be managed, towards emphasizing the wider array of
co-constituting human and more-than-human spatiotemporal relationships, the
contested water governance in Myanmar gets illuminated. As such, water is ulti-
mately bound to wider, historically-grown processes and power-relations as visible
within the ongoing peace negotiations. Looking at different networks of actors
within the hydrosocial arena of Burma, I have argued that the production of scale is
currently being contested and constitutes an important battleground about the future
rules of decision-making and the actors involved in it, as well as the power relations
within the wider network of actors. Scales are not a priori given – neither as a
centralized Union state with hierarchal scales nor as independent localized factions
evolving around the ‘community’ – but are subject to continuous contestation.
Understanding scalar articulations as intertwined and overlapping with other
scalar imaginations and manifestations, as present along the Salween, brings to the
fore the complex hydrosocial relations. This is apparent when considering how the
envisioned SPP both connects and opposes a range of other scalar articulations: as
part of the land of the Karen – Kawthoolei – and as such connects to KNU-based
ways of organization; or simultaneously, as located in the ‘ofﬁcial’ administrative
demarcation of Karen State which are to underlie the Union-based water gover-
nance paradigms. In addition, the SPP is part of the Salween River basin, both
bound by the nation-state borders and as a transboundary river that connects to
neighboring China and Thailand. Similarly, the NWRC is ultimately bound to the
nation-state’s (internal and external) boundaries, but simultaneously favoring
international hegemonic IWRM and the river basin scale with its ‘ignorance’ to
socially constructed borders. These represent just a few of the multiple overlapping
scalar articulations, structured by certain rules and normative frameworks,
embedded in wider hydrosocial networks, and subject to distinct power relations.
Political authority in Myanmar, and in particular in the Salween basin, is highly
fragmented with intensely contested political power-relations, which are built on
complex historical accounts (e.g. Callahan 2007). Looking at Myanmar’s current
politics, the degree of decentralization is highly controversial with a clear uniﬁed
vision lacking. This further complicates questions about the future rules of water
governance. Even with federalism established and institutional structures changed,
decentralization processes do not automatically redistribute power-relations or
empower local actors, as demonstrated in other contexts (e.g. Marks/Lebel 2016;
Norman/Bakker 2009). Looking at the “incomplete decentralization” (Marks/Lebel
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2016) in neighboring Thailand shows how the degree of power redistribution is
dependent on much more than an institutional restructuring. Within an arena of an
emerging political system of National and Regional/State governance, as well as
existing grey areas with quasi-/non-state actors seeking self-determination under a
strong federalism, rules and regulations around water are yet to be (re)established
with claims on the ‘appropriate’ scales being made by a range of actors with their
respective narratives. Within such an understanding, the politics of scale constitutes
a key battleground around which water governance is currently being (re)deﬁned.
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